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according to Searle (2010), the existence of a State brings a paradox with it. On one side, 
since a State is a social object, its existence seems to imply the existence of a collective 
acceptance towards it; on the other side, the existence of this collective acceptance 
seems to be granted only by the existence of a State that is capable to exercise violence 
– if needed – on its citizens by means of the military and the police. This implies a 
contradiction for, if the existence of a government should in principle rely on the free 
and voluntary acceptance of a certain social system, at the same time it seems that this 
acceptance derives only from the exercise of brute force, and thus it is all but voluntarily. 
i will argue that this paradox can be solved only if we distinguish two different notions of 
collective acceptance: one that can be individuated at the level of natural facts, the other 
at the level of social – and, more precisely, institutional – facts.
THE PARADOx OF gOVERNMENT: 
ExPlAININg THE lIFE AND DEATH  
OF A STATE 
83
according to Searle (2010) social reality has only a derived kind of existence, 
since it depends on the collective acceptance of certain constitutive rules 
of the form: “We make it the case, by declaration, that a status function y 
exists in context c” (Searle 2010, 101). For example, we can make it the case, 
by declaration, that a President exists in the context of the italian republic.
this picture of the construction of social reality holds also for a complex 
social entity such as a State. More precisely, Searle specifies, a State can be 
conceived as a system of status functions, that is, a structured and coherent 
set of social entities that are put into existence by the collective acceptance 
of a series of constitutive rules (Searle 2010, 163). among the status 
functions that constitute a State we can include its law system and all the 
institutions through which the State accomplishes its tasks (the ministers, 
the provinces, the schools, etc.). 
however, the existence of a State also poses an important problem for Searle’s 
account, leading to the so-called paradox of government (Searle 2010, 160ff). 
in fact, Searle observes, if the existence of a government seems to depend 
on the existence of a collective acceptance, the existence of this collective 
acceptance seems to depend, in turn, on the existence of a government, that 
has the power to exercise violence – if needed – on its citizens, by means of 
the military and the police (Searle 2010, 163). more precisely, what Searle 
defines as the “paradox of government” should be better described as a 
double problem. on one hand, the paradox poses a problem of circularity on 
the ontological level, since the existence of a government seems to rely on 
the existence of a collective acceptance, but the existence of this collective 
acceptance seems to be grounded, vice versa, on the existence of a government 
endowed with coactive powers. on the other hand, the paradox also involves 
a contradiction, because, when we say that governmental power is based 
on collective acceptance, we mean a free and voluntarily act of acceptance, 
whereas, when we say that collective acceptance is granted by the existence 
of the military and the police, this acceptance seems to be obtained through 
coercion instead.
Searle focuses mainly on this latter problem and tries to solve this 
contradiction by denying the second horn of the dilemma. in other words, 
what Searle claims is that the threat of violence that is exercised by the 
military and the police is not per se a form of coercion: it does not force 
anyone to accept the government, rather, it motivates the citizens to accept 
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the government providing them with desire-independent reasons to act 
according to the government. 
in order to explain the idea of a desire-independent reason Searle gives 
the following example: suppose, he says, that i have promised to someone 
that i will meet her the following day at 9 a.m. When the day comes, i 
would rather desire to stay in bed, but the obligation that i have with this 
person “gives me a reason to want to do it” (2010, 167). in other words, the 
existence of this obligation, created by my promise, gives me a desire-
independent reason to stand up and go to the meeting. the same holds 
for other kinds of social realities. For example, although i have no desire 
at all to pay taxes, i do it because of the threat of being sent to jail and, 
much the same way, although i can dislike the government i have and 
desire to have another, i can nevertheless accept it for the same reason. 
of course, this is not necessarily the only reason to accept a certain social 
reality: for example, i can be motivated to pay taxes also because i simply 
recognize that paying them is the right thing to do in order to maintain 
the healthiness of the collectivity in which i live, or i can decide to accept 
the government, even if i dislike it, because i know that the elections were 
valid and thus i want to respect the majority’s will. Still, even if i accept 
a certain government only because of the threat of violence that it could 
exercise, this acceptance, Searle claims, is free and voluntary: i am not 
forced, but the threat of violence is simply effective in providing me with a 
good reason to act in a certain way (Searle 2010, 167ff).
as said above, however, the problem of contradiction is not the only problem 
created by the paradox of government. more importantly, the paradox poses 
an ontological problem, that becomes clearer if we take into consideration 
a political situation such as the libyan revolution. as known, starting from 
February 2011 libya has experienced a long period of civil war, that perhaps 
cannot be considered concluded yet. during the war the libyan citizens have 
been basically divided into two opposite alliances: one faithful to the old 
government, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and its leader, Gaddafi; the other 
that was trying, instead, to overthrow Gaddafi’s regime and constitute an 
antagonist government, the national transitional council. 
given this situation, in which a collective acceptance is clearly lacking, one 
could then ask which of the two competing governments was really existing: 
was it the libyan arab Jamahiriya or the national transitional council, or 
perhaps both? and what is the criterion, then, to decide which social entities 
exist and which do not?
the problem is that, the libyan case set aside, collective acceptance 
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can never be total: every political system, be it a democratic state or a 
totalitarian regime, always houses some dissidents, people who try to 
change their regime, by legal or illegal means. Just think of anarchists: 
they are typically recognized by the State as citizens, but they do not 
recognize, in turn, the existence of the State nor, when imprisoned, they 
recognize the legitimacy of the police and that of the judicial system 
under which they are posed; rather, what they claim is that some people 
are violating their freedom by using on them brute force. they “call them 
out of the play”, so to say, not recognizing what the collectivity accepts, 
instead, as existent, and their ontology seems to include much less entities 
than other people’s.
to be true, Searle partly recognizes this problem and admits that: “for the 
political system to function there has to be recognition or acceptance of a set 
of status function by a sufficient number of members of the group sharing 
collective intentionality” (Searle 2010, 171, emphasis added). So, he seems to 
recognize, at least, that collective acceptance is never total. the problem, 
however, is that in Searle’s theory collective acceptance grants something 
more than the actual functioning of a government: it grants the reality itself 
of the government. But, if we say that the existence of a government is 
based on a sufficient degree of collective acceptance, the problem is then 
to establish which is the minimal degree of acceptance that can grant the 
existence of a social entity. For example, which degree of acceptance could 
have granted the existence of the libyan arab Jamahiriya? 70%? 90%? 50% 
plus one? the risk, of course, is that of falling in the sorites paradox, ending 
up with social entities with vague boundaries.
as i suggested above, the problems raised by the paradox of government 
can be solved, in my view, only if we distinguish two different notions 
of collective acceptance, one that refers to a social – or, more precisely, 
institutional – fact, the other to a natural one. in order to clarify the 
distinction between these two notions we can gain some important insights 
if we look at the theory of law.
In the first edition of his reine rechtslehre (1934), while discussing the 
foundation of the law system – and thus of the State itself1 – hans kelsen 
describes a case that seems very similar to the libyan situation. more 
precisely, he takes into consideration the case of a revolution that tries to 
overthrow a monarchy and to establish a republican regime:
a band of revolutionaries stages a violent coup d’etat in a monarchy, 
1 For kelsen the State coincides with its law system.
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attempting to oust the legitimate rulers and to replace the monarchy with a 
republican form of government. if the revolutionaries succeed, the old system 
ceases to be effective, and the new system becomes effective, because the 
actual behaviour of the human beings for whom the system claims to be valid 
corresponds no longer to the old system but, by and large, to the new system 
(Kelsen 1992, 59). 
A revolution, then, can be defined as succeeded and a new system is 
established, according to kelsen, only if the actual behavior of the human 
beings involved changes, so that they stop conforming to the old law system 
and start behaving according to new rules. in saying this, kelsen is giving 
an implicit formulation of a principle that has been central in his entire 
philosophical reflection, meaning, the principle of efficacy:
The validity of a legal system governing the behaviour of particular human 
beings depends on the fact that their real behaviour corresponds to the legal 
system – depends in a certain way, as one also puts it, on the efficacy of the 
system (Kelsen 1992, 60, emphasis added). 
It is worth noting that by the term “validity” Kelsen means the specific kind 
of existence of juridical entities. kelsen thus endorses a position which is very 
close to the one proposed by Searle insofar as they both distinguish the level of 
social and institutional facts from the level of natural facts and both maintain 
that what founds the existence of a social entity such as a State is nothing but its 
efficacy, that is, a natural fact: a behavior of acceptance shown by a certain group 
of people who live in a certain territory. 
this notion of collective acceptance, however, does not seem to be the 
only one at disposal. if we look at other theorists of law, in particular the 
theorists of the early modern State, a different notion seems to emerge. one 
of the main ideas characterizing modern States, in fact, is that of popular 
sovereignty: a government is a form of organization that a certain people 
has decided to give to itself, and thus it is, by definition, the expression of a 
collective will. 
a clear formulation of this idea can be found, for example, in one of the former 
theorists of the modern State, marsilius of Padua. in his defensor pacis (1324) 
Marsilius affirms in fact that law emerges as the product of a persona ficta, that 
is as the product of a juridical person that represents the collectivity or, at least, 
the best part of it (pars valentior). the existence of a law system, in other words, 
presupposes, in marsilius’ view, the existence of a collectivity that detains the 
sovereignty and that has decided to put into existence the law system itself. 
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however, according to marsilius, this collectivity is an entity with a different 
ontological status with respect to physical entities: it is a fictional entity for, 
of course, we need to conceive the collectivity as a single person, with a single 
will. Nearly five centuries later, in his metaphysics of morals, kant expresses an 
idea which is very close to marsilius’ one, when he observes that “legislative 
power can be due only to the collective will of the people [vereinigte Volkswille]” 
(1797, § 46, transl. mine). 
although typical of democracies, then, the idea that the law system is the 
product of the entire collectivity and thus of a collective will is not restricted 
to democracies, but it applies to every regime which is based on the notions of 
people’s sovereignty, and thus on some sort of representative power. 
another good example is represented by the italian referendum of 1946, by 
means of which the italian people was called to choose between republic 
and monarchy. on June the 2nd more than 22 million italians voted: republic 
won with 12 million votes against the 10 million votes for monarchy. this, 
of course, does not mean that all italians immediately accepted the new 
republican regime: on the contrary, in the following weeks there were many 
protests and riots by the monarchists. Finally, however, on June the 18th 
the Supreme Court ratified the results of the referendum and the Republic 
was formally set up. this means that the majority’s will (expressed through 
the referendum) became the will of the entire nation, and thus of all italian 
citizens. in other words, despite the fact that a lot of people were not willing 
to accept the newborn government, its instauration was, in virtue of the 
law, the expression of the will of all citizens, no one excluded.
in this sense, then, besides the notion of collective acceptance understood 
as a natural fact – a collective behavior of acceptance towards a certain 
government – we can identify another notion of collective acceptance 
which seems to found all regimes in which the people is sovereign: in 
those regimes the majority’s will becomes, by default, the will of the entire 
collectivity. to put it in another way, democratic regimes presuppose, by 
definition, the idea of a collectivity which has accepted them. But, if this notion 
of collective acceptance is presupposed by the law system itself, it cannot 
consist in a natural fact – it is not the actual behavior of a collectivity – but 
it will rather consist in a social, and more precisely institutional, fact – a fact 
whose existence is stated by the law system itself. 
given the two notions of collective acceptance that we distinguished in the 
previous paragraph we can now come back to the paradox and ask ourselves 
which of the two is involved in it. Let us recall, first of all, the exact 
formulation of the paradox:
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governmental power is a system of status functions and thus rests on 
collective recognition or acceptance, but the collective recognition or 
acceptance, thought typically not itself based on violence, can continue to 
function only if there is a permanent threat of violence in the form of the 
military and the police (Searle 2010, 163). 
the paradox can be thus broken down into two different claims:
(1) governmental power is a system of status functions and thus rests 
on collective acceptance;
(2) but collective acceptance, in turn, functions only if there is a 
government which is capable to exercise a permanent threat of 
violence on its citizens in the form of the military and the police.
now, if we consider claim (2), it is clear that the notion of collective 
acceptance to which it makes reference is the natural one, meaning: the 
behavior of acceptance shown by the citizens of a State. the threat of 
violence exercised by the military and the police, in fact, can have an 
efficacy only on the minds, and thus on the behavior of people, providing 
them, as seen, with desire-independent reasons to act in a certain way 
rather than others. claim (1), however, does not seem to refer to the same 
notion. What this statement claims, in fact, is that the existence of a 
government is founded on the collective acceptance of a series of rules but, 
as seen, the collective acceptance posed at the basis of a State – at least in 
democratic regimes – is typically a fictio iuris, an entity whose existence is 
presupposed by the existence of the State.
the paradox of government can be thus solved without denying any of 
the two horns of the problem, but simply by recognizing the ambiguity 
of the notion of collective acceptance involved in it, which indeed stands 
for two different entities: a social and a natural one. if these two notions 
are distinguished, the circularity problem immediately disappears. When 
we say that the military and the police grant the existence of collective 
acceptance, we make reference, in fact, to a behavior of acceptance – the 
fact that people choose to conform their actions to a certain regime 
rather than another. instead, when we say that the existence of collective 
acceptance founds the existence of a State, we are rather making reference 
to the fact that a State – at least a State founded on popular sovereignty – is 
by definition the product of a collective will, the will of the entire people.
most importantly, recognizing the difference between these two notions 
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allows to solve the problem of vagueness that seems to afflict, instead, 
Searle’s social ontology. if one founds the existence of a State on collective 
acceptance conceived as an institutional entity, then the question of which is 
the minimal degree of acceptance which assures the existence of a State can 
easily be avoided (See § 2), since this kind of collective acceptance is always 
– by definition – total (it is the expression of the entire people). Speaking of a 
“sufficient number of members of the group sharing collective intentionality” 
(Searle 2010,  171), in other words, makes sense only if collective acceptance 
is conceived as a natural fact – the behavior of a certain group – but not if we 
conceive collective acceptance as a fictio iuris. 
Before concluding, i want to take into consideration also a possible objection 
that could be raised against my solution. if collective acceptance is to be 
conceived as a fictio iuris, an entity whose existence is presupposed by the 
existence of a certain kind of regime, one could object in fact that it is 
impossible to found the existence of a State on this collective acceptance. 
in other words, if the existence of (social) collective acceptance is stated 
– implicitly or explicitly – by a certain law system, then (social) collective 
acceptance cannot found, in turn, the existence of the law system, and thus 
of the State that is based upon it. in this sense, analogously to Searle, also my 
solution would incur a circularity problem: either social collective acceptance 
founds the existence of a State or it is the State (and, more precisely, its law 
system) that founds the existence of social collective acceptance. 
this objection, however, fails to distinguish two different kinds of priority: 
a temporal priority and a logical one. if it is true that collective acceptance 
comes into existence, from the temporal point of view, only when a certain 
law system starts to exist, the existence of collective acceptance is logically 
presupposed by the existence of a certain law system (if there is a system 
based on popular sovereignty, then we must suppose that there was a 
collective will that put this system into existence). So, from the logical and 
ontological point of view, collective acceptance is necessarily prior to the 
existence of a State, and thus it is collective acceptance which founds the 
existence of a State, whereas the reversal is necessarily false. 
Finally, in saying that the only notion that can found the existence of a 
government is social collective acceptance, i do not intend to deny the 
importance that natural collective acceptance – the actual behavior of 
citizens towards the government – has in order to maintain a government. 
certainly, natural collective acceptance is the presupposition for the 
birth of a certain government and, symmetrically, the vanishing of this 
collective acceptance can be the presupposition for the death of that regime 
in the sense that, even if a regime is imposed with the use of brute force 
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and coercion, normally it cannot resist for a long time if the majority of 
citizens rebels against it. So, it is certainly true that the lacking of collective 
acceptance understood as a brute fact (a collective behavior) can provoke, 
for example, the fact that those who are in power abandon their places and 
that a new regime can be constituted, but what founds the existence of a 
(representative) regime, i claim, cannot be only a collective behavior of 
acceptance, but it is rather the collective acceptance of the entire people, 
which is presupposed – explicitly or implicitly – by that regime.
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